Tutorial #9. Moral Particularism. Discussion Questions

After having read Jennifer Flynn (2010). "Recent Work: Moral Particularism." Analysis 70 (1), try to think about these questions.

• Are there rules that may never be permissibly broken?
• Are there any useful moral rules?
• Are there any morally relevant pattern of features in the world?
• Can we say in advance, without taking into consideration the whole context, whether a certain feature in a situation is morally relevant? Think of whether the fact that an action makes others happy is always a reason to do it.
• Should morality be understood in terms of rules, principles and theory?
• Is holism in the theory of reasons true, and would its truth support “particularism”?
• What is a moral generalization? Give some examples
• Do moral reasons vary with context?
• Do some features of the world have a default moral relevance? For example, in the absence of appropriate justification is "killing" always wrong?
• If there are no moral rules, how can we know what we ought to do in particular situations?
• Do we acquire moral knowledge as if we were moral particularists

Tutorial # 9. Moral Principles and Moral Particularism. In a Nutshell

+ The (alleged) role of principles and rules in moral thought and judgement.

- Criteria of right and wrong actions that can be applied to any case and allow us to derive particular moral judgements that tell us what we ought to do in any given situation.
- Systematize morality.
- Justify and explain our particular moral judgements.
- Standards of moral evaluation and decision-making.
- Make our behaviour more predictable.
- Help us to perceive morally relevant features in a situation.
- Necessary in moral development and education.

+ Moral particularists have a negative attitude towards principles.

They defend some or all of the following claims:
- There are no or at most very few (true or defensible) moral principles.
- Moral principles are not necessary for moral reasoning.
- Moral principles are not even useful in moral reasoning.


From Dancy (2004: 7). Ethics Without Principles

"Generalism:
The very possibility of moral thought and judgement depends on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles.

Particularism:
The possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles."

From Jennifer Flynn (2010). "Recent Work: Moral Particularism." Analysis 70 (1).

"Two sorts of claims [for particularism]: one relates to moral principles, the other to moral reasons. Particularism as an overall position generally involves commitments about both sorts of claims: moral principles do not exist (or are unnecessary), and moral reasons function holistically."

"The holism of reasons maintains that ‘a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another’ (Dancy 2004: 7). Put slightly differently, the idea is that a reason can make an action right under one set of circumstances without always making an action right in all circumstances."

Tutorial #8. Virtue Ethics. Discussion Questions

After having read R. Hursthouse, (1996) ‘Normative Virtue Ethics’, in Crisp (ed.) How Should One Live (reprinted in Ethical Theory), think about the following questions.

• The question virtue ethics try to answer is: "How should I live?". The answer is: "Flourish by cultivating your virtues!". But what is a virtue? Is it a feature of our character? Is it a disposition to act in a certain way in determinate situations? Is it something different?
• How do we know what virtues we have or can hope to have?
• How can one cultivate \ educate his or her virtues?
• Can Virtue Ethics give a noncircular account of right action?
• What is the relation between virtues and emotions? Can we educate our emotions? How can we get our emotions in harmony with our rational recognition of certain reasons for acting so and so in a given situation?
• Can we motivate that certain behaviour and emotions are appropriate in a certain context rather than in others?
• What is the role of the environment in one's attempt to "flourish"? How much do your circumstances (e.g. where you live, your family, your friends, your education, the time when you live etc) affect the posibility of your "flourishing"?
• Do virtues change over time and across cultures? If so, would this undermine virtue ethics? Can we identify universal virtues?
• Being willing to have lots of sexual partners may be regarded as a virtue (e.g. an example of openness) but also as a vice (say, lust) at the same time. Is there a principled way to argue that a certain character is intrinsically virtuous (or vicious)? Are we condemned to “relativism”?
• Benevolence, Courage, Chastity, Wisdom, Honesty can be considered as examples of virtues. Drunkenness, Caprice, Egoism, Laziness, Lust, Stupidity, Dishonesty as examples of vices. For which reasons are they considered virtues and vices? Is there any particular virtue indispensable for the pursuit of happiness?
• Consider Mandeville's poem. Is vice necessary for a wealthy, and happy society?
• Do virtues presuppose a certain moral view?

A good introduction to Virtue Ethics is Virtue Theory by Gregory Pence, Originally published in Peter Singer, A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell Publishing, 1991).

Tutorial #8. Virtue Ethics. Virtue and Vices

From http://www.philosophers.co.uk/cafe/phil_oct2003.htm

By Alex Voorhoeve

"Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) was a doctor and pamphleteer, whose works had a large impact on the course of eighteenth century social philosophy. Mandeville was born and educated in the Dutch Republic. After being implicated in a popular uprising in his native city of Rotterdam, he travelled Europe and settled in London.

Mandeville started a practice as a doctor and soon began to write. In 1705, he published a poem, The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves Turn'd Honest. It tells of a wealthy and powerful beehive whose inhabitants act only in pursuit of gain and esteem. Nevertheless, they espouse an ethic that condemns this behaviour and frequently lament that their society is full of sin. Irritated by their constant complaining, their god decides to make them all virtuous. In a flash, their society comes to a stop: commerce and industry are abandoned, and the bees leave their once flourishing hive and withdraw to live simply in the hollow of a tree. The moral is that virtue can only lead to a poor, ascetic society, whereas the vices are the necessary engines of a wealthy and powerful nation"

Here is the Moral of the poem

by Bernard de Mandeville (1670 – 1733)

The M O R A L.
THEN leave Complaints: Fools only striveTo make a Great an honest Hive. [410]T'enjoy the World's Conveniencies,Be famed in War, yet live in EaseWithout great Vices, is a vainEutopia seated in the Brain.Fraud, Luxury, and Pride must live; [415]Whilst we the Benefits receive.Hunger's a dreadful Plague no doubt,Yet who digests or thrives without?Do we not owe the Growth of WineTo the dry, crooked, shabby Vine? [420]Which, whist its shutes neglected stood,Choak'd other Plants, and ran to Wood;But blest us with his Noble Fruit;As soon as it was tied, and cut:So Vice is beneficial found, [425]When it's by Justice lopt and bound;Nay, where the People would be great,As necessary to the State,At Hunger is to make 'em eat.Bare Vertue can't make Nations live [430]In Splendour; they, that would reviveA Golden Age, must be as free,For Acorns, as for Honesty.

If you are curious, you can find all the poem HERE

Tutorial # 7. Social Contract Theory. Discussion Questions

In light of the Introduction to Part X Contractarianism in Shafer-Landau R. ed., 2007 Ethical Theory: an anthology, and after having read "The Stag Hunt" by Brian Skyrms, think about the following questions.

• Where do norms come from?
• How should we study the origin and justification of citizens' duty to obey the law? Should we look at anthropology, history, sociology, etc?
  
• What does generate a duty to obey the law?
• What's the nature of the agreement envisaged by contractarianists? Does it need to be real, explicit and formalised? Consider Hobbes's state of nature and Rawls's original position.
• How should we characterize the contracting parties (ie the people who are about to agree on a "social contract")? Should they be smart? omniscient? emotional?
  
• How should we conceive of their conditions of choice? Are deliberations sensitive to time? Is there any external pressure? Should debate be allowed? Are all parties in the same position?
  
• What should the subject matter of the negotiations be? Should all aspects of social interaction be discussed? What kind of rules (particular or very abstract) should be fixed?
  
• Do you find it reasonable that you renounce in part to your liberty to be protected from murder, stealing and cheating?
• Why don't people generally free-ride (ie break some rule to reap a windfall) in our society?
• Do we have good reason to do something only if doing it will serve our self-interest?
• In which sense the Stag Hunt is the 'prototype of the social contract'?
• What are the differences\similarities between the prisoners' dilemma and the stag hunt?
  
• What is an "equilibrium"? Take a look at the game theoretic definition of the stag hunt.
  
• Are evolutionary game theoretic explanations of social phenomena irrelevant to understand the nature and dynamics of morality? Think about the kind of explanation of the social contract given by Skyrms.

Tutorial # 7. Social Contract Theory. The Stag Hunt

Many authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation.
Some authors believe that the the prison's dilemma is the wrong game to understand social cooperation.

The prototype of the social contract is instead the stag hunt.

The Stag Hunt
Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality:

"If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..."


For a formalization in game theory of the stag hunt check HERE

Tutorial # 7. Social Contract Theory. Few Definitions

Fig. from Principiacomica

See also Contractarianism by Ann Cudd (SEP)

Contract theory places the foundation of morality in an agreement struck and kept by all moral agents. As with consequentialist and deontological theories, there are many variants of the theory.

Contract Theory –
The family of moral and political theories concerned with contract or agreement.

Contractarianism - (Hobbes, Gauthier).
Morality concerned with constraints in the face of rational pursuit of self-interest.

Contractualism – (Rawls, Scanlon).
Morality concerned with understanding and respecting others as rational beings who can justify their actions

Tutorial # 6. Deontologism at Work. Kant on Animals. Discussion Questions

After having read "Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals" by Christine M. Korsgaard, think about the following questions.

• What are the criteria for moral standing according to Kant?
• Do non-human animals have moral standing (moral importance)?
• If animals are not rational nor autonomous, is it okay to treat them in any way we like?
• We kill, eat, hunt, experiment on, "enslave" a wide range of animals. Humans have destroyed large parts of the natural environment depriving animals of a place in which to live. Does any of this matter morally? Why?
  
• Does Kant think that non-human animals have rights? Does he think that we have duties to them?
• Does deontologism really implicate that animals have only instrumental value? Do you agree with Korsgaard's "reading" of deontology?
• Are animals means to men’s ends?
• Is there anything intrinsically wrong in torturing animals?
• Is it a moral duty to be vegetarians?
• Is it immoral to use animals for scientific experiments?
• Do non-human animals have desires and beliefs that can be satisfied/frustrated and true/false? Why is it morally important to answer that question?

Tutorial # 6. Deontologism at Work. Kant on Animals

Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative:
Humanity as an End in Itself
(see Shafer-Landau, Ethical Theory. Introduction to part IX)

- Good Will: Motivation to do one's duty for its own sake.
- Only rational and autonomous beings have a will.
- Autonomy: The capacity to form goals free of external constraints/influence.
- Rationality: The faculty to reason appropriately about the implications of one's goals.
- Autonomy and Rationality generate the moral demand to treat others with respect.

Principle of Humanity:
"Act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only"

+ Immanuel Kant "We Have No Duties to Animals"
(from Lectures on Ethics - in Ethical Theory. An Anthology, pp. 395 - 396)

"If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog... but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealing with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals."

"... so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. ... Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity."

"Vivisectionists. who use living animals for their experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as man's instruments."

Tutorial #5. Deontologism. Discussion Questions

Try to think about these questions in light of "The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" by Immanuel Kant (pp. 525 - 536 On our "Ethical Theory" textbook) .

Another very good reference is the "Deontological Ethics" entry by Larry Alexander & Michael Moore in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/

• What should motivate moral action, according to Kant?
• What is the ‘good will’ and how does Kant argue that it alone is good without qualification?
• What is a categorical imperative and is Kant right about the validity and content of the categorical imperative?
• Do you think the good will is something subjective? In what sense?
• Kant writes (Groundwork, in Feinberg&Landau p. 626): “… in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were its preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out its purpose. For all the actions that the creature has to perform for this purpose … would be marked out for it far more accurately by instinct”. Do you agree? Does instinct serves happiness better than reason?
• Kant (Groundwork, in Feinberg&Landau p. 627) argues that “the true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good in itself”. The premises of the argument are three: (I) “Reason is not sufficiently competent to guide the will with regards to its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs” (II) “Reason is nevertheless given to us as practical faculty, that is, as one that is to influence the will” (III) “Nature has everywhere else gone to work purposively in distributing its capacities”. Assess this argument.
• How do we know that an action is made not only in conformity with duty but also from duty?
• Can love be commanded?
• How does the representation of the law determine the will? Is respect for the law a causal relation?
• “You shall not murder”, or “You shall not lie” are examples of categorical imperatives: That is, they are duties that all rational beings ought to respect (recall Kant’s “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”). Now, do you think we ought to respect a categorical imperative - no matter what?
• Consider this maxim: “Steal when you are too poor to feed yourself”. Would it pass the universalizability test? Would it be a moral law?
• Does Kant give us a moral theory that we can follow?
• Would the universalizability test solve moral dilemmas? E.g. consider the following. A mental with a gun in her hand ask you where your best friend is because she wants to kill your friend. Should you tell the truth to the mental? Or should you lie in order to protect your friend?
• For Kant the consequences of an action don’t bear on the moral status of the action. Do you agree? Imagine, e.g., a baby-sitter who by acting from duty keeps a baby warm by putting it in the microwave. Do you think that an unintentional bad consequence of an action made from duty don’t bear on the moral status of that action?

Tutorial # 5. Deontologism. Kant's Fun

Some funny stuff about Kant...

A Rant about Kant by Neven Sesardic

Kant Attack Ad

Tutorial # 5. Deontologism. Kant's Life. Some Anectodes

From Andreas Teuber's webpages:
http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/kantbio.html

"Years of living frugally, increases in his salary, and honoraria for his publications enabled Kant in 1783 to buy a house on Prinzessinstra and to hire a cook. (A few years previous he had employed as his footman Martin Lampe, a retired Prussian soldier remembered for his dullness). At this time Kant reorganized his daily routine, which changed little for the rest of his life. He subjected himself to the severest regimen to maintain his health, for he was a small, frail man with a delicate constitution. He arose punctually at five o'clock and drank a few cups of tea while he thought about the day's lectures. At seven he went downstairs to the room reserved as his classroom and taught until nine. Then he wrote until lunch, which always began precisely at one o'clock. He looked forward to this meal with keen anticipation, not only because it was the only one he permitted himself but because it was a social event. Since he thought conversation aided digestion, and he was gregarious by nature, there were always from three to nine guests--never fewer than the graces, never more than the muses, he explained. As he did not like to talk shop in his free time, he selected the guests from a variety of occupations--politicians, doctors, lawyers, officers, merchants, students, colleagues, or anyone who happened to be passing through town and wanted to see him. The food was plentiful, the wine flowed freely, the atmosphere was casual, the conversation was stimulating. Women were not invited. This exclusion, coupled with his lifelong bachelorhood, led to speculation that he disliked women. This notion is incorrect. He often said about himself that when he needed a wife he was too poor to feed one, and when he was at last able to feed one he did not need one anymore.
After lunch came the famous walk, which he took every day regardless of the weather. It lasted precisely one hour, and the route rarely varied. He always walked alone, convinced that breathing through the mouth, which conversation necessitates, was unhealthy. This ritual was not without problems during the summer, for perspiration disgusted him; at the slightest indication he would seek out a shady spot and stand perfectly still until he was dry again. He spent the evening reading or writing. At precisely ten o'clock he went to bed. Unlike the rest of the house, the bedroom was never heated, even during frigid weather. The window was never opened, and he refused to keep a candle in the room; if he had to get up during the night he felt his way along a rope running from the bed to the door. When he was ready to fall asleep he always pronounced the name "Cicero" a few times.

In 1802, Kant discharged the man (named Lampe) who had faithfully served him for many years. He proved unable, however, to dismiss Lampe from his mind. The troubled philosopher finally entered a memorandum in his notebook: "Remember," it read, "from now on the name of Lampe must be completely forgotten."

Tutorial # 5. Deontologism. Kant's Ethics. A Very Short Primer

From http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/kantbio.html
Prof. Andreas Teuber's webpage

"In answering the question of what ought to be, Kant says that instead of our actions conforming to the facts--the situations in which we find ourselves or the inclinations we happen to have--they should conform to our principles. These principles are derived from reason. A true moral act, he says, depends on the motive of the action, not on the outcome. The only motive that is good in itself, without qualification, is the good will: that is, the desire to act according to duty. Duty is discovered by reason and is the same for everyone at all places and at all times. He formulates the moral law in his famous categorical imperative:

"Handle, so da die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könnte"

(Act in such a way that the principle of your will could at any time also become the principle of a universal law). In other words, if an action could not be made universal without contradicting itself, that action is immoral. Kant illustrates this principle with the example of the false promise.

To get himself out of a financial difficulty, a person proposes to borrow some money. He knows that he will never be able to pay the money back, but he also knows that he will not receive the loan unless he promises to repay the lender. Should he, then, falsely promise to pay the money back? A moment's reflection shows that if such an action were made universal--if everyone made false promises-the institution of promising would go out of existence, because no one would accept a promise anymore. Thus the false promise would, if made universal, negate or contradict itself; and self-contradiction is the epitome of irrationality. Immorality, then, is equivalent to irrationality

On How to Improve your Essay...

The most common comments you are likely to receive on your essays - and that I also receive on my own essays, are the following:

- "The structure and the goal of yor paper are not stated" "They are not obvious to the reader";
- "Explain this claim";
- "Inaccurate in reconstructing Mr X's view" "Be charitable!";
- "What do you mean here?" "I don't get it";
- "This is unclear, or confused, too hard to follow";
- "This is a technical term, be precise!";
- "Why? Give reasons!";
- "What's the relation between this claim and that claim?";
- "What is the conclusion?"; "Does your conclusion follow from the premisses?"
- "This is irrelevant" "Stick to the topic"
- "Give an example!"

MORALS:
If you anticipate these comments, you can prevent me to make them!
Thus your essay will improve.

If your essay does not receive the mark you expected, don't be discouraged.
Writing philosophy is not an easy task. But working seriously and constantly, your writing will improve for sure.

On Referencing

Here is some examples for referencing:

For a book:
Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: Free Press.

For a joural article:
Thaler, R. H. (1988) "Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, pp. 195–206.

For an article reprinted in a volume:
Cartwright, N. (1983) "Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?", in Curd, M. & Cover, J. A. eds. (1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. London: W. W. Norton and Company, pp. 865-877.

For an online article:
Beyer, C. (2007). “Edmund Husserl”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/husserl/.

For an "old" classic - there are a few ways:
Anselm, St., Proslogion, in St. Anselm's Proslogion, M. Charlesworth (ed.), Oxford: OUP, 1965

or

Kant, I., 1781, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781, vols. 3 and 4 of Gesammelte Schriften, de Gruyter & Co., 1969; page references are to the English translation, Critique of Pure Reason,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

or

Kant, I., 1780 (1965), The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals, J. Ladd, Trans., Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.

- Finally, here is an example for brief quotations in the body of your essay:
"… thus we come to see that ‘”meanings” just ain’t in the head!" (Putnam 1977, p. 704).

Tips for your Essay

Here is Some Suggestions for your essay.

- First, Jim Pryor has an excellent website, where you can find some Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper. They are very useful! Try to take a look.

- Second, make clear the structure of your paper right at the beginning. State the goal of your paper: What is your aim? What are you going to do? Give a brief outline of how you are going to proceed to make your point: What are you going to do first?; What are you gonna do then? How are all the steps in your argument related?

- Third, try to "delimit your own territory".
Focus! Make small points; be "modest" in your claims.
Don't be afraid of using such expressions as "it seems", "it may be the case", "it might be".
Always give reasons! Motivate your claims.

- Fourth, polish, polish, polish!
Use short sentences, with very few adjectives, and connect the sentences logically with the right conjunctions.

- Fifth, use relevant references and the right referencing.

Tutorial # 4. Consequentialism. Discussion Questions

After having read Singer, Peter “Famine, affluence and morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 229-43, try to think about the following questions.
An online version of Singer's article can be found HERE.

• Should we be doing more to relieve poverty?
• Why do we have a strict obligation to save a nearby drowning child but no comparable obligation to save faraway starving children through charitable donations?
• What are the differences, if any, between, Singer’s cases and the cases in the trolley problem? Take a look at the video.
• If we understood the psychology underlying our moral intuitions in Singer’scases, would we be any more sensitive to distant suffering? Why?
• What sort of consequences count as good consequences?
• How are the consequences judged and who judges them?
• Does great poetry create more pleasure than sex, drugs and dub?
• Why some kinds of pleasure may be more desirable than others?
• Is it better to be deluded but happy than be unhappy but for “real”? Why?
• If happiness amounts to the satisfaction of our desires, and some kind of happiness is more desirable than others, how can we try to educate our desires to reach that kind of happiness?
• How would you calculate the expected utility of an action? In your utilitarian calculus, should you take into account also the consequences that would affect animals? For instance, how would you weigh up your pleasure for a burger at McDonalds’ and the pain suffered by that animal?
• How is utility inter-personal comparison possible? Put it in English, how can you compare, for example, the pleasure of a sadist with the suffering of a victim? How can you compare the mental pleasure of watching a football match with the physical pleasure of having a freshly baked pizza?
• If it turned out that hanging an innocent publicly once a month dramatically reduces crimes, should we hang innocent people?
• Should we impose pleasure to others? For example, If putting LSD in water makes people happier, would you be justified to pour LSD in the aqueducts of Edinburgh?
• How would a consequentialist argue to explain why it is wrong (or right) to bake a stranger who agrees to be baked? Would it make sense such kind of consequentialist explanation?

Tutorial # 4. Consequentialism. The Trolley Problem

Think about the following pair of scenarios offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson:

A runaway trolley rushes towards five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will divert the trolley onto another set of tracks where it will kill only one person instead of five.
What should you do?

Same scenario as before. A trolley is hurtling down a track towards five people. This time, you are on a bridge under which it will pass, and you can stop it by dropping a heavy weight in front of it. As it happens, there is a very fat man next to you - your only way to stop the trolley is to push him over the bridge and onto the track, killing him to save five. Should you proceed?

…

The Trolley Problem. VIDEO

What should a consequentialist do?

What is the difference that motivates these different moral judgements?

Tutorial # 4. Consequentialism. A Few Distinctions

Fig. from Principia Comica

What is Consequentialism?

Excerpts from Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006). ‘Consequentialism’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Def. The view that the value of an action is determined by the value of its consequences rather than by the principle on which the action is performed or the virtue it expresses.
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory, where the relevant value is individual happiness or well-being.

[Distinctions]

"Classic utilitarians held hedonistic act consequentialism: an act is morally right if and only if that act causes "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," as the common slogan says.

Classic utilitarianism is actually a complex combination of many distinct claims, including the following claims about the moral rightness of acts:

Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on consequences (as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or anything that happens before the act).

Actual Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the actual consequences (as opposed to foreseen, foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences).

Direct Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act itself (as opposed to the consequences of the agent's motive, of a rule or practice that covers other acts of the same kind, and so on).

Evaluative Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the value of the consequences (as opposed to other features of the consequences).

Hedonism = the value of the consequences depends only on the pleasures and pains in the consequences (as opposed to other goods, such as freedom, knowledge, life, and so on).

Maximizing Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on which consequences are best (as opposed to satisfactory or an improvement over the status quo).

Aggregative Consequentialism = which consequences are best is some function of the values of parts of those consequences (as opposed to rankings of whole worlds or sets of consequences).

Total Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the total net good in the consequences (as opposed to the average net good per person).

Universal Consequentialism = moral rightness depends on the consequences for all people or sentient beings (as opposed to only the individual agent, present people, or any other limited group).

Equal Consideration = in determining moral rightness, benefits to one person matter just as much as similar benefits to any other person (= all who count count equally).

Agent-neutrality = whether some consequences are better than others does not depend on whether the consequences are evaluated from the perspective of the agent (as opposed to an observer).
…
Any consequentialist theory must accept the claim that I labeled ‘consequentialism’, namely, that certain normative properties depend only on consequences. If that claim is dropped, the theory ceases to be consequentialist.
It is less clear whether that claim by itself is sufficient to make a theory consequentialist."

Tutorial # 3. Value. Discussion Questions

After having read Isaiah Berlin, “On the Pursuit of the Ideal,” New York Review of Books, 17 March 1988, pp. 11-18., think about these questions.

• Compare “Inter Milan is a better football team than AC Milan”, “Vodka is good”, “Miriam is a good person”. What’s the difference? How ‘good’ is used in these statements?
• Are the objects of value subjective psychological states or objective states of the world?
• Do we value money, sex or power for their own sake?
• Are there intrinsic values? Think about knowledge and scientific endeavours highly abstract (e.g. certain branches of math)?
  
• Is pain intrinsically bad?
• Can we observe values?
• Can we measure values? Can we measure how good a person is?
• Can values such as liberty and safety be commensurable? For example, can you promote personal freedoms at the same time as attempting to protect national security (e.g., through anti-terror legislation)? Can you promote freedom of choice while protecting the sanctity of life (e.g., in issues of euthanasia, abortion, and animal rights)?
• Can we resolve a disagreement about who is the hottest: Johnny Depp or Cristiano Ronaldo? Why?
• What’s the relationship between desirability and value?
• Where do values come from?
• What’s the difference between values and norms? Consider for instance the claims: “It is good to give to charity”, “One ought to give to charity”.
• When are human relationship false? Think of the quote from T.S. Elliot.
• Is Berlin’s confidence on the objectivity of values in a pluralist schema justified? Why/why not?
• Berlin describes two factors that shaped human history in the 20th century. What were they? Do you think he is right?
  
• Berlin mentions relativism. What do you think about what he says? What’s the difference with pluralism?
• At one point Berlin says: "any study of society shows that every solution creates a new situation which breeds its own new needs and problems, new demands. The children have obtained what their parents and grandparents longed for...but the old ills are forgotten, and the children face new problems, brought about by the very solution of the old ones, and these, even if they can in turn be solved, generate new situations, and with them new requirements—and so on, forever—and unpredictably." (p. 14) What does he mean?
  
• Berlin begins his final section, VI, with a question: "If the old perennial belief in the possibility of realizing the ultimate harmony is a fallacy, and the positions of the thinkers I have appealed to—Machiavelli, Vico, Herder, Herzen— are valid,…[then] ‘What is to be done?’ How do we choose between possibilities What and how much must we sacrifice to what? (p. 17)." How would you try to answer that question?
  

Tutorial # 3. Value. The Value of Human Relationships

From The Fire Sermon by T.S. Elliot (1922)

Unreal City
Under the brown fog of a winter noon
Mr. Eugenides, the Smyrna merchant
Unshaven, with a pocket full of currants
C.i.f. London: documents at sight,
Asked me in demotic French
To luncheon at the Cannon Street Hotel
Followed by a weekend at the Metropole.
At the violet hour, when the eyes and back
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits
Like a taxi throbbing waiting,
I Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives,
Old man with wrinkled female breasts, can see
At the violet hour, the evening hour that strives
Homeward, and brings the sailor home from sea,
The typist home at teatime, clears her breakfast, lights
Her stove, and lays out food in tins.
Out of the window perilously spread
Her drying combinations touched by the sun's last rays,
On the divan are piled (at night her bed)
Stockings, slippers, camisoles, and stays.
I Tiresias, old man with wrinkled dugs
Perceived the scene, and foretold the rest—
I too awaited the expected guest.
He, the young man carbuncular, arrives,
A small house agent's clerk, with one bold stare,
One of the low on whom assurance sits
As a silk hat on a Bradford millionaire.
The time is now propitious, as he guesses,
The meal is ended, she is bored and tired,
Endeavours to engage her in caresses
Which still are unreproved, if undesired.
Flushed and decided, he assaults at once;
Exploring hands encounter no defence;
His vanity requires no response,
And makes a welcome of indifference.
(And I Tiresias have foresuffered all
Enacted on this same divan or bed;
I who have sat by Thebes below the wall
And walked among the lowest of the dead.)
Bestows one final patronising kiss,
And gropes his way, finding the stairs unlit . . .
She turns and looks a moment in the glass,
Hardly aware of her departed lover;
Her brain allows one half-formed thought to pass:
"Well now that's done: and I'm glad it's over."
When lovely woman stoops to folly and
Paces about her room again, alone,
She smoothes her hair with automatic hand,
And puts a record on the gramophone.

Tutorial # 3. Value. Some Distinctions

Picture from xkcd


From Value Theory by Mark Schroeder (2008) - SEP

Three senses of "Value Theory"

I. “value theory” is a catch-all label used to encompass all branches of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and sometimes feminist philosophy and the philosophy of religion — whatever areas of philosophy are deemed to encompass some “evaluative” aspect.

II. "value theory" synonymous with “axiology”. Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are. For instance, a traditional question of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological states, or objective states of the world.

III. “value theory” designates the area of moral philosophy that is concerned with theoretical questions about value and goodness of all varieties — the theory of value.

...

[Consider these sentences]

1) Pleasure is good.

2) It is good that you came.

3) She is good for him.

4) That is a good knife.

Sentences like 1, in which “good” is predicated of a mass term… in which philosophers have wanted to know what things (of which there can be more or less) are good.

Sentences like 2 make claims about what I'll (again stipulatively) call goodness simpliciter; this is the kind of goodness appealed to by traditional utilitarianism.

Sentences like 3 are good for sentences, and when the subject following “for” is a person, we usually take them to be claims about welfare or well-being.

And sentences like 4 are what… I'll call attributive uses of “good”, because “good” functions as a predicate modifier, rather than as a predicate in its own right.
…

[The Issues]

Traditional axiology seeks to investigate what things are good, how good they are, and how their goodness is related to one another. Whatever we take the “primary bearers” of value to be, one of the central questions of traditional axiology is that of what stuffs are good: what is of value.

Tutorial # 2. Why Be Moral. The Immoralist Challenge. Discussion Questions

After having read Plato's The Republic, book 2, selection: 357a-367e (reprinted as ‘The Immoralist’s Challenge’ in Ethical Theory), think about these questions.
NOTE you can find an HTML version of The Republic @ The Perseus Digital Library

• Is our "duty" always identical with our self-interest. Why?
• Do we always know what our self-interest is?
• Is our self-interest determined by what we want?
• Give examples of "just behaviour". Is justice good in and of itself?
• Does being moral really serve our self-interest?
• What is good about being just, if others mistreat you because of your reputation?
• What should we do (and do we usually do in fact) when our duty conflicts with our self-interest?
• Are we always motivated by self-interest?
• Is there anything worthwhile in itself - regardless of its consequences?
• Do we have a natural tendency to be just (even when nobody can see us)?
• Is justice a convention?

Tutorial # 2. Why Be Moral. The Immoralist Challenge. Glaucon's Argument

Why act justly?

In the second book of the Republic, Glaucon begins by dividing goods into three categories:
1. goods that we desire for their own sake (e.g. joy);
2. goods that we like for their own sake as well as for their beneficial effects (e.g. health and knowledge);
3. goods that we desire only for their beneficial effects and not for their own sake (e.g. taking a medicine).

Being just is beneficial when others notice it and one gains a reputation for being just (as for 2.).
There can be clear disadvantages to being unjust; if others find out, it harms one's reputation, and unjust actions are likely to make one anxious that others will discover those actions (as for 3.).

What about 1.?
Glaucon's thought experiment.
He asks Socrates and Adeimantus to compare two people, one of whom is just, the other of whom is unjust.
The unjust person has a reputation for justice, despite the fact that he acts unjustly.
The just person has a reputation for being unjust that he will carry to his grave without prospect of correcting it.
Hence the unjust person will enjoy all of the benefits of a good reputation, while the just person will suffer all of the harms of a bad reputation.

Glaucon thinks that it is obvious that the life of the fortunate, unjust person is better than the life of unfortunate, just person.
Therefore justice is desirable only for its beneficial effects, and not for its own sake, and so in this respect is similar to medicine.

Tutorial # 2. Why Be Moral. The Immoralist Challenge. Trasymachus' Argument

In the first book of Plato's Republic Thrasymachus presents Socrates with the immoralist's challenge.

P1 The consequences of being moral can be disastrous for one's happiness, (e.g. imprisonment, torture, poverty, and death).
P2 By contrast, the intended consequences of immorality are highly desired components of happiness (e.g. power, wealth, and honor) (343a- 344c).
Therefore, we should not be moral if we want to be happy.
Moral people must be simpleminded; they cannot be wise (348b-d).

In the first book of the Republic, Thrasymachus attacks Socrates’ position that justice is an important good. He claims that ‘injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice’ (344c).
Thrasymachus makes three central claims about justice.
1. Justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger (338c)
2. Justice is obedience to laws (339b)
3. Justice is nothing but the advantage of another (343c).

Here is Trasymachus' argument:

P1 The ruling group or person is the stronger of the parts of a society.
P2 In a tyranny the tyrant passes laws to his\her advantage.
P3 In an aristocracy aristocrats pass laws to their advantage.
P4 In a democracy the (ruling) masses pass laws to their advantage.
There are no other types of regime.
Therefore, The ruling part of any nation passes [and enforces] laws that are to its own advantage.

P5 Every ruling party defines justice as obeying the law
P6 All ruling parties agree on defining justice as obeying the law is the correct definition.
Hence, justice is obeying the law.

Justice is everywhere to the advantage of the ruling party.
Justice is everywhere [to] the advantage of the stronger.

Tutorial #1. The Status of Morality. Ought and Is. Discussion Questions

After having read David Hume, ‘Moral Distinctions not Derived from Reason’ in Ethical Theory, think about these questions. Note An HTML Edition of the relevant reading from Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature can be found from eBooks@Adelaide "The University of Adelaide Library": HERE

• Can you derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’?
• What is the difference, if any, between a claim like “You ought to buy the next round of drinks” and one like “You ought to keep your promises”?
• Does the fact that most drivers in Italy run red lights entails that running a red light is right? Why?
• Do we have a “sense impression”, or experience, for rightness and wrongness?
• Is morality objective, and if so in what sense(s)?
• How do you understand “naturalism” in moral philosophy?
• Can ethics be considered as a “natural social science” - see Greene's article?
• What can, if anything, scientific evidence contribute to our understanding of morality?
• In which sense, according to Hume, justice is an “artificial virtue”? What is his argument?
• Why ought one to keep a promise, or ought not to steal? What are the grounds for these rules? Are they different from the grounds of a rule such as “you ought not to burp while eating dinner”?
• If we were Vulcans, would anything change in the status of morality?

note the cartoon above is by Stephen M. Campbell

Tutorial #1. The Status of Morality. Science and Morality

How can our understanding of ethics and morality be affected by empirical sciences?

From Josh Greene (2003):

Many moral philosophers regard scientific research as irrelevant to their work because science deals with what is the case, whereas ethics deals with what ought to be. Some ethicists question this is/ought distinction, arguing that science and normative ethics are continuous and that ethics might someday be regarded as a natural social science. I agree with traditional ethicists that there is a sharp and crucial distinction between the ‘is’ of science and the ‘ought’ of ethics, but maintain nonetheless that science, and neuroscience in particular, can have profound ethical implications by providing us with information that will prompt us to re-evaluate our moral values and our conceptions of morality.

The full article is:
Greene, J.D. (2003) From neural "is" to moral "ought": what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Vol. 4, 847-850.

Tutorial #1. The Status of Morality. Hume on Ought-Is

The "is-ought gap" (see David Hume, ‘Moral Distinctions not Derived from Reason’):

1. All claims that can be known by reason are either empirical matters of fact or conceptual truths (e.g. "All bachelor are married", "All triangles have three corners").
2. Moral claims do not represent empirical matters of fact.
3. Moral claims do not represent conceptual truths.
4. Therefore, reason cannot give moral knowledge.

Any valid argument for an ought claim must have at least one ought-claim among its premises.
Ethical claims about what is right or wrong are ought claims.
A valid argument for an ethical claim must have some other ethical claim among its premises.
Therefore, no number of facts about how things are deductively entails that they ought to be one way or another.

NOTE
- Hume was an empiricist:
In general, empiricism is the thesis that:
We have no source of knowledge (or for the concepts we use) other than sense experience.

Hume maintains that all the materials of thinking, which he calls "perceptions", can be divided into two categories:
1) impressions, which are called sensations.
2) The less forceful, remembered copies of our immediate experiences, which are called ideas.
All ideas come from impressions.
Ideas can be combined.

Relations of ideas include mathematics.
Mathematical claims are true by virtue of the meaning of the terms, and to deny them is to assert a contradiction.
But these do not tell us what the world is like.
Matters of fact are based on sensory experience.
There is no contradiction in asserting that they are false.
They do not enjoy certainty but can be known only with varying degrees of probability.